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INVESTMENT BANKERS AS 
UNDERWRITERS—BARBARIANS OR 
GATEKEEPERS? A RESPONSE TO BRENT 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
As an alternative to traditional underwritten initial public securities offerings 
(IPOs), direct exchange listing by issuers—in which securities are sold on an 
exchange directly into trading markets without intermediary selling processes, 
participants, and the substantial expenses that mark firm commitment 
underwritten offerings—have captured the attention of tech companies.1 Spotify 
Technology SA (NYSE: SPOT) and Slack Technologies, Inc. (NYSE: WORK) 
recently demonstrated the viability of direct listing: each became a public company 
by carrying out a public offering via direct listing on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE).2 The companies made the offerings in compliance with the Securities Act 
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 1. Brent J. Horton, Spotify’s Direct Listing: Is It a Recipe for Gatekeeper Failure?, 72 SMU L. REV. 
177, 188–91 (2019); Greg Rodgers, Marc Jaffe & Benjamin Cohen, Evolving Perspectives on Direct 
Listings After Spotify and Slack, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 17, 2019), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/12/17/evolving-perspectives-on-direct-listings-after-spotify-
and-slack/ [https://perma.cc/7EJT-VPHY]. 
 2. Maureen Farrell, Alexander Osipovich & Anne Steele, Spotify’s Splashy Debut Pressures Banks, 
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 3, 2018, 7:31 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/spotify-shares-jump-in-market-
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of 1933 (Securities Act) registration statement and offering process requirements, 
but without the involvement of underwriters, syndicates, traditional road shows, 
aftermarket stabilization processes, or lock-up restrictions that typify traditional 
underwritten public offerings.3 Investment bankers acting as advisers assisted the 
companies in planning and executing the offerings.4 Importantly, however, the 
shares sold in these direct listed offerings were held by existing Spotify and Slack 
shareholders.5 Neither company engaged in the capital formation that would 
normally characterize an IPO, and as such these were not primary offerings by 
issuer companies.6 
The NYSE rule for “Selling Shareholder Direct Floor Listing” upon which 
these companies relied does not cover primary offerings by issuers.7 The success 
of the Spotify and Slack direct listed offerings for selling shareholders prompted 
calls for modification of NYSE listing rules to permit primary direct floor listings 
by issuers themselves in addition to selling shareholders.8 The NYSE commenced 
an initiative to accomplish this by applying to the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) for approval of a rule change amending Chapter 1 of the 
NYSE Listed Company Manual to modify the provisions relating to direct listings 
accordingly.9 
The initial NYSE proposal to the SEC to permit primary direct floor listings 
was unceremoniously rejected last year.10 The NYSE continued its initiative, 
however, with a modified proposal.11 After nine months of trying, on August 26, 
2020, the SEC approved a change to listing requirements, allowing for primary 
direct listings.12 The change amended Chapter 1 of the NYSE’s Listed Company 
Manual by offering an alternative to the traditional IPO process for primary 
 
debut-1522773951 [https://perma.cc/8YH9-HRML]; Maureen Farrell & Corrie Driebusch, Slack 
Shares Jump in Trading Debut, WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2019, 6:44 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/slack-set-for-its-trading-debut-11561040327 
[https://perma.cc/NNK2-J63U]. 
 3. See Horton, supra note 1, at 189–90. See generally Maureen Farrell & Ana Rivas, Palantir’s 
IPO Shortcut: A Direct Listing, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2020, 4:05 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-ipo-shortcut-a-direct-listing-11560976972 
[https://perma.cc/7TG3-FXGZ]. 
 4. Farrell et al., supra note 2; Farrell & Driebusch, supra note 2; see also Horton, supra note 1, 
at 195. 
 5. See Benjamin J. Nickerson, Comment, The Underlying Underwriter: An Analysis of the Spotify 
Direct Listing, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 985, 986 (2019). 
 6. Anat Alon-Beck, Investment Bankers as Underwriters: Barbarians or Gatekeepers?, FORBES (Oct. 
13, 2020, 12:56 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anatalonbeck/2020/10/13/investment-
bankers-as-underwriters-barbarians-or-gatekeepers/#48a855504af7 [https://perma.cc/M6EW-
G3LZ]. 
 7. See Order Approving NYSE Proposed Rule Change to Modify Provisions Relating to Direct 
Listings, Exchange Act Release No. 34-89684, 85 Fed. Reg. 54,454, 54,458 (Aug. 26, 2020). 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. Alexander Osipovich, SEC Rejects NYSE Plan to Expand Direct Listings, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 
2019, 6:21 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-rejects-nyse-plan-to-expand-direct-listings-
11575674476 [https://perma.cc/8H98-C8AJ]. 
 11. N.Y. Stock Exch. L.L.C., Proposed NYSE Rule Change by a Self-Regulatory Organization 
(Form 19b-4) (Nov. 26, 2019). 
 12. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, 85 Fed. Reg. at 54,455. 
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offerings.13 Private companies would thus be able to use direct listings to do IPOs 
and raise new capital.14 On September 4, 2020, the Nasdaq Stock Market followed 
up with its own direct listing proposal,15 which at the time of writing remains 
pending.16 
Changes to permit primary offerings via direct listing will help private 
companies to overcome some of the obstacles imposed by our securities laws and 
listing rules.17 Direct listings have generated much attention in the media and 
support from prominent venture capitalists such as Bill Gurley.18 Direct listing 
has never been advanced as right for every company, and of those which would 
qualify under the new rules for primary direct listing, many would no doubt still 
prefer the traditional underwritten public offering.19 However, direct listing 
clearly has the potential to meaningfully disrupt the IPO process.20 First and 
foremost, primary offerings by direct listing would eliminate the involvement of 
investment banker underwriters in the offering process, and instead permit issuers 
to engage the assistance of “financial advisers” who play no traditional 
underwriter role in the offering.21 In the traditional IPO process,22 investment 
bankers as firm commitment underwriters perform valuation analyses, engage in 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. The rule changes provide for further changes to the minimum listing value, allowing a 
company to meet the applicable aggregate market value requirement if either (1) the company will 
sell at least $100 million in market value of its shares in the Opening Trade; or (2) the aggregate of 
the Primary Direct Floor Listing amount and the shares that are publicly held immediately prior to 
the listing is at least $250 million, with the market value calculated using a price per share equal to 
the lowest price of the price range established by the issuer in its registration statement. Id. 
 15. Notice of Nasdaq Proposed Rule Change Relating to Direct Listing with a Primary Offering, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-89878, 85 Fed. Reg. 59,349, 59,349 (Sept. 15, 2020). There are some 
minor differences between the NYSE and Nasdaq proposed rules with regards to the valuation and 
flexibility on pricing outside the range indicated in the prospectus. David Lopez, Jeffrey D. Karpf, 
Helena K. Grannis, Adam Fleisher, Nicolas Grabar & David Parish, Direct Listings 2.0 – Primary Direct 
Listings, CLEARY GOTTLIEB (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/news-and-
insights/publication-listing/direct-listings-20-primary-direct-listings [https://perma.cc/K62Q-LPKS]. 
According to a memorandum by Cleary Gottlieb, “Nasdaq would allow an issuer to proceed with a 
listing at a price up to 20% below the registration statement range, and with no limit above the 
registration statement range.” Id. This means that the “likelihood of a failed auction would be lower 
than under the NYSE rule.” Id.; see also NASDAQ, RULEBOOK: THE NASDAQ STOCK MARKET § IM-
5315-1 (2020). 
 16. Amit Katarina, Brian Snyder & John Owen, Morrison & Foerster Discusses Investor Exits: U.S. 
Direct Listing Rules in Flux, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Sept. 14, 2020), 
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/09/14/morrison-foerster-discusses-investor-exits-u-s-
direct-listing-rules-in-flux/ [https://perma.cc/KW6D-X4CK]. 
 17. Allison Herren Lee, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Investing in the Public Option: 
Promoting Growth in Our Public Markets, Remarks at the SEC Speaks in 2020 (Oct. 8, 2020) 
(transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/lee-investing-public-option-sec-speaks-
100820 [https://perma.cc/XZ9J-BC4Q]). 
 18. See Ari Levy, Inside Bill Gurley’s Mission to Upend the Tech IPO Market in Favor of Direct Listings, 
CNBC (Oct. 6, 2019, 10:28 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/06/bill-gurleys-plan-to-move-
from-tech-ipos-to-direct-listings.html [https://perma.cc/CJ8Y-85QS]. 
 19. See Horton, supra note 1, at 188, 201. 
 20. See Rodgers et al., supra note 1. 
 21. See Horton, supra note 1, at 182–83. 
 22. See generally id. 
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“book building,”23 decide (with the issuer) on the price,24 go on road shows to 
market the securities,25 and sell and stabilize the offering.26 That said, critics, 
prominently including Professor Brent Horton, see direct listing as a danger to 
investors; Horton argues that direct listing of primary offerings eliminates the 
“gatekeeper” role of traditional underwriters and denigrates investor protection.27 
Horton thoughtfully articulates his concern that financial advisers to a direct 
listing do not have the same incentives as firm commitment underwriters to act 
as gatekeepers.28 The NYSE, on the other hand, persuasively argued that the 
absence of a traditional underwriter gatekeeper would not compromise investor 
protection.29 The SEC agreed.30 Approving the modified NYSE proposal, the SEC 
concluded that the existing liability framework under the Securities Act for 
registered offerings that would apply to all direct listings assured that the NYSE 
rule is consistent with investor protection.31 
Notwithstanding the NYSE’s successful argument to the SEC on risk reduction 
stemming from other non-underwriter gatekeepers,32 these alternative gatekeepers 
serve vastly different functions than those of a traditional underwriter.33 Despite 
the difference in roles, the SEC concluded that “financial advisors’ reputational 
interests” are sufficient to protect investors, combined with “potential liability, 
including as statutory underwriters.”34 The Commission also concluded that the 
 
 23. “Book building” is a term used to refer to the process by which the investment banker, in 
its role as an underwriter, samples investor interest in the offering and works on determining the 
price at which the IPO will be offered. Horton, supra note 1, at 184; see also Victor Fleischer, Brand 
New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1594 (2006). 
 24. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 1, at 184; see also William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Untold Story of 
Underwriting Compensation Regulation, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 625, 629–30 (2010); Shane A. Corwin 
& Paul Schultz, The Role of IPO Underwriting Syndicates: Pricing, Information Production, and Underwriter 
Competition, 60 J. FIN. 443, 448 (2005); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic 
Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 654 (1988). 
 25. Horton, supra note 1, at 184; see also Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing: Legal and 
Economic Analysis of the Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 
583, 613 (2004). 
 26. See Horton, supra note 1, at 205; see also Alexander Hamilton Frey, Federal Regulation of the 
Over-the-Counter Securities Market, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 26 (1957); Samuel N. Allen, A Lawyer’s Guide 
to the Operation of Underwriting Syndicates, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319, 348–50 (1991); Richard A. 
Booth, Discounts and Other Mysteries of Corporate Finance, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1053, 1090 (1991). 
 27. See generally Horton, supra note 1. 
 28. Id. at 201–04. 
 29. See Letter from Elizabeth K. King, Chief Regul. Officer, Intercont’l Exch., Inc., to Vanessa 
Countryman, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 16, 2020) (on file with SEC) [hereinafter King 
Letter]. 
 30. Order Approving NYSE Proposed Rule Change to Modify Provisions Relating to Direct 
Listings, Exchange Act Release No. 34-89684, 85 Fed. Reg. 54,454, 54,460 (Aug. 26, 2020). 
 31. Id. In its approval Release, the SEC stated: “[T]he Commission believes that the financial 
advisors to issuers in Primary Direct Floor Listings will be incentivized to engage in robust due 
diligence, notwithstanding the lack of a firm commitment underwriting agreement.” Id. The SEC 
observed that a firm commitment underwriting is not necessary to provide adequate investor 
protection in the context of a registered offering, and that “issuers and other gatekeepers, with their 
attendant liability, play important roles in assuring that disclosures provided to investors are 
materially accurate and complete.” Id. 
 32. King Letter, supra note 29. 
 33. See Horton, supra note 1, at 201–02. 
 34. Order Approving Proposed NYSE Rule Change, 85 Fed. Reg. at 54,460. The Commission 
declined to denote financial advisors as statutory underwriters, merely stating that they may be 
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absence of a statutory underwriter would not preclude investors from recovering 
the same amount of damages as they would via a traditional IPO.35 It did not 
address the impracticality of calculating these damages or obtaining the necessary 
standing to seek such damages, merely stating that, given the requirement to 
register all Primary Direct Floor Listings under the Securities Act, the existing 
regulatory framework would be sufficient protection.36 
II.  THE CII ROADBLOCK 
Despite SEC approval, progress toward implementation of the approved NYSE 
listing rule permitting primary direct floor listings has recently halted. On August 
31, 2020, in an effort to overturn approval of the NYSE rule change, the Council 
of Institutional Investors (CII) filed a notice with the SEC to challenge the 
approval.37 As reported by the Wall Street Journal on September 1, 2020, the SEC’s 
approval is now “on pause after an influential group of institutional investors took 
an unusual regulatory step in a last-ditch effort to block it.”38 The CII raised 
several concerns regarding the new rule and focused heavily on the uncertain role 
of financial advisers and whether investor protection is compromised.39 
There is a need for clarity on this and other issues. For example, will financial 
advisers assume responsibilities and liability functionally as underwriters? Will 
purchasers of securities in direct listed public offerings that involve both primary 
and secondary sales have standing to bring private actions under Section 11 of the 
Securities Act,40 where “tracing” is required?41 And how will Section 11 damages 
be determined? 
We believe Horton overstates the “danger” to investors posed by direct listings42 
and that the CII is misguided in its concern that investor protection would be 
 
deemed as such and would be appropriately subject to relevant liabilities. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 54,461. The Commission went on to note that in a traditional firm commitment 
offering, investors may still face difficulties tracing purchases back to registered offerings, adopting 
the position of not addressing the issue across the board, rather than combating a higher risk. Id. 
 37. Letter from Jeffrey P. Mahoney, Gen. Couns., Council of Institutional Invs., to Vanessa 
Countryman, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 31, 2020) (on file with SEC) (notifying the SEC of 
CII’s intent to petition for review of the Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change). 
 38. Alexander Osipovich, NYSE Direct Listings Hit Snag as Investor Group Raises Concerns, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 1, 2020, 6:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nyse-direct-listings-hit-snag-as-investor-
group-raises-concerns-11599000009 [https://perma.cc/S343-VJ5J]. 
 39. See Letter from Jeffrey P. Mahoney, Gen. Couns., Council of Institutional Invs., to Vanessa 
Countryman, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 16, 2020) (on file with SEC) [hereinafter CII 
Concern Letter]. 
 40. Section 11 of the Securities Act creates a private right of action for any person acquiring 
securities in a registered public offering to recover damages on account of an information failure in 
the registration statement. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). Section 11 provides for strict liability of the issuer of 
the securities and for liability of others associated with the offering, specifically including every 
underwriter, subject to certain “due diligence” defenses. Id. § 77k(a)–(b). 
 41. See Ken Cunningham, Grant Thornton, Bruce R. Braun & Neil H. Conrad, Litigating Section 
11’s Tracing Requirement: A Practitioner’s View of a Powerful Defense, BUREAU NAT. AFFS. (June 2019), 
https://www.sidley.com/-/media/publications/bloomberg-lawlitigating-section-11s-tracing-
requirement-a-practitioners-view-of-a-powerful-defense.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/8VC5-PEJU]. 
 42. See Horton, supra note 1, at 210–11. 
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compromised.43 We applaud, however, Horton’s ideas for making direct listings 
safer for investors as a general matter,44 and we offer some further thoughts below. 
A.  FINANCIAL ADVISERS AS UNDERWRITERS AND GATEKEEPERS? 
Underwriters in registered public offerings are commonly considered 
gatekeepers.45 Underwriters are expressly liable under Section 11 for materially 
false or misleading statements in a registration statement (the principal part of 
which is the prospectus used in the offering).46 Unlike issuer liability, however, 
underwriter liability is not absolute.47 A statutory due diligence defense 
(reasonable investigation) applies to underwriters, from which their gatekeeper 
role arises by implication.48 Professor Andrew Tuch has characterized underwriter 
liability as “perhaps the most complex and difficult to justify.”49 The strategy 
behind Section 11 of the Securities Act to impose liability on underwriters for the 
information failures of their issuer clients is meant, at least in theory, to 
incentivize the underwriters to deter client wrongdoing by conducting due 
diligence and monitoring (or at least influencing) the conduct of issuers.50 
In a public offering via direct exchange listing, there is no underwriter.51 
Rather, although not necessarily, issuers engage investment bankers as financial 
advisers.52 There is a need for clarity on whether the investment bankers acting as 
financial advisers face Section 11 liability in the new direct listing process. If the 
answer to this question is yes, then the investment bankers will theoretically have 
the same incentives as in a traditional IPO to conduct due diligence in connection 
with the preparation of the registration statement and execution of the offering. 
If the answer is no, then the CII can argue that, due to the reduced risk of liability 
in a direct listing, underwriters will be less effective as gatekeepers under the new 
rule—an argument the SEC Division of Trading and Markets rejected.53 
Financial advisers in direct listed offerings may well fall outside the express 
underwriter liability scheme of Section 11 of the Securities Act. They are not the 
firm commitment underwriter fairly envisioned in Section 11.54 But acting in the 
role of financial adviser to the issuer in a direct listed public offering fairly 
connotes active participation with the issuer and others associated with the issuer 
in carrying out the offering. There are ample bases for liability under antifraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws to purchasers of the securities when the 
 
 43. See CII Concern Letter, supra note 39; Osipovich, supra note 10. 
 44. See Horton, supra note 1, at 211–12. 
 45. E.g., Nickerson, supra note 5, at 988 n.13. 
 46. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(5). 
 47. See Nickerson, supra note 5, at 1007; Andrew F. Tuch, The Limits of Gatekeeper Liability, 73 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 619, 631–32 (2017). 
 48. See Tuch, supra note 47, at 631. 
 49. Id. at 619. 
 50. Id. at 631–32. 
 51. Horton, supra note 1, at 179. 
 52. Id. at 180. 
 53. Order Approving NYSE Proposed Rule Change to Modify Provisions Relating to Direct 
Listings, Exchange Act Release No. 34-89684, 85 Fed. Reg. 54,454, 54,460 (Aug. 26, 2020). 
 54. See Nickerson, supra note 5, at 1008–09. 
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financial adviser plays an active, facilitative role coupled with knowledge of 
information failures or such recklessness as to support a finding of culpability 
under antifraud provisions.55 As the SEC pointed out in its approval of the NYSE 
primary listing rule, there is no requirement that there be an underwriter in a 
public offering.56 That does not mean, however, that application of federal 
securities laws’ general antifraud provisions as the basis for both private actions 
by purchasers of securities in an offering and SEC enforcement actions is in any 
way affected or its impact lessened. This includes the incentive for financial 
advisers playing an active role to exercise the same kind of due diligence that 
would be front and center in defending against Securities Act Section 11 claims 
against a traditional underwriter.57 
Horton argues that the investment banker acting as financial adviser rather 
than underwriter does not face “statutory pressure” to act as a gatekeeper.58 “It is 
unlikely,” he states, “that a financial advisor [in a direct listed public offering] 
would be considered a statutory underwriter” and thus would not face liability 
under Securities Act Section 11.59 In fact, depending on facts and circumstances, 
the financial adviser in a direct listed public offering could clearly be identified as 
a “statutory underwriter.” “Statutory underwriter” is a term of art attached to 
Securities Act Section 2(a)(11), which defines underwriter to include any person 
who “participates or has a direct or indirect participation” in a distribution of any 
security.60 A financial adviser in a direct listed offering could easily fit the bill. 
Statutory underwriter status under Section 2(a)(11) has enormous liability 
consequences for violations of the registration statement and offering process 
requirements in Section 5 of the Securities Act.61 However, such status is not 
relevant in determining the Section 11 liability of an actual underwriter identified 
and contractually committed as such in a registered public offering for materially 
false or misleading information in a registration statement.62 By and large, courts 
have not sustained Section 11 liability claims for misstatements and omissions in 
a registration statement made against one who is alleged only to be a statutory 
underwriter under the definition in Section 2(a)(11).63 However, recently, in a 
decision of first impression, the Northern District of California found as a matter 
of law that Section 11 liability may not be purely inescapable within the context 
of a direct listing.64 The Ninth Circuit has agreed to hear an appeal, but it remains 
 
 55. Id. at 1015–16. 
 56. Order Approving Proposed NYSE Rule Change, 85 Fed. Reg. at 54,460. 
 57. See Nickerson, supra note 5, at 1020. 
 58. Horton, supra note 1, at 203 chart 5. 
 59. Id. 
 60. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11). 
 61. See id. §§ 77b(11), 77d(a)(1). Falling within the “underwriter” definition of Section 2(a)(11) 
precludes reliance on the transaction exemption for sales of securities in Section 4(a)(1) of the 
Securities Act for sales by persons other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer. See id. §§ 77b(11), 
77d(a)(11). 
 62. See Nickerson, supra note 5, at 1014, 1016. 
 63. See Pirani v. Slack Techs., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 3d 367, 378 (N.D. Cal. 2020). 
 64. See id. at 379, 381; see also Nicolas Grabar, David Lopez & Andrea Basham, A Look Under 
the Hood of Spotify’s Direct Listing, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 26, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/26/a-look-under-the-hood-of-spotifys-direct-listing/ 
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in early stages.65 Nevertheless, the financial adviser participating in a direct 
offering faces ample exposure to liability and concomitant pressure under other 
antifraud provisions. Horton, and by extension, the CII, are perhaps right that 
financial advisers have no Section 11 liability incentive to be gatekeepers, but we 
believe there is, in fact, ample incentive under other provisions for those who take 
on the active role of a financial adviser. 
B.  INVESTOR PROTECTION? 
Do direct listings provide less investor protection than traditional IPOs? If the 
entire focus is on the availability of the private remedy in Section 11 of the 
Securities Act, critics have a point. For example, consider that issuers may choose, 
like Slack, to structure their direct listings so that the shares available for trading 
on the first day include not only shares that are part of the registered offering, but 
also shares being resold pursuant to Rule 144.66 The strict tracing requirement of 
Section 11 makes it difficult for some plaintiffs to establish standing for their 
Section 11 claim because they must trace the shares they purchased to those that 
were part of the registered offering.67 However, once standing is shown, the 
liability of an issuer under Section 11 is strict, and thus easier for plaintiff 
purchaser to plead and prove.68 Those investors who do not have standing under 
Section 11 are free to seek recovery under other general antifraud provisions, the 
most obvious being Securities Exchange Act Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, 
which are not constrained by any Section 11 requirements.69 As a practical matter 
in class action litigation, claims under both Securities Act Section 11 and 
Securities Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are almost invariably 
asserted in the same action.70 Issuers and other offering participants may escape 
Section 11 claims based on strict tracing, but will not escape broader antifraud 
claims simply because a mix of shares are sold coincident with the direct listed 
registered public offering. 
There are other challenges for investors seeking to enforce Section 11 liability 
for direct listed offerings, such as limitations on recovery of damages. Under 
Section 11(g) the amount recoverable is limited to the offering price.71 What does 
this limitation mean in the context of a direct listing? What is the price at which 
the security was “offered” to the public? Even if investor plaintiffs can demonstrate 
standing by tracing their securities to the registration statement or otherwise 
 
[https://perma.cc/V2PZ-449T]. 
 65. See Grabar et al., supra note 64. 
 66. Id. 
 67. In re Century Aluminum Co. Sec. Litig., 729 F.3d 1104, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 68. See Nickerson, supra note 5, at 1006. 
 69. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020). 
 70. John J. Clark, Jr., Robert D. Weber & Kellin M. Chatfield, Securities Litigation: Class Actions 





 71. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(g) (“In no case shall the amount recoverable . . . exceed the price at which 
the security was offered to the public.”). 
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overcome the tracing requirement, what are the damages? There is no public 
offering price as such, only a reference price which serves as the basis for initiation 
of bids at the time the shares are listed.72 
C.  WHY DIRECT LISTING? RISE IN PRIVATE PLACEMENTS & NEW LIQUIDITY 
MECHANISMS 
Unicorn firms are now deliberately choosing to stay private and wait longer 
before they decide to do an IPO.73 According to empirical research by Jay Ritter, 
in the past, venture capital (VC)-backed startups would do an IPO or trade sale 
within four years,74 but now they are staying private longer than eleven years.75 
Unicorns are able to stay private longer because they can raise large amounts of 
capital from non-traditional investors, as well as use new legal mechanisms that 
allow investors to liquidate their investments.76 
In the last few years until the recent COVID-19 pandemic, new, non-
traditional, deep-pocketed market actors were pouring money into large private 
technology firms which were historically dominated by VC investors.77 
Institutional and high net-worth investors, such as SoftBank, mutual funds, hedge 
funds, corporate venture capitalists, private equity, and sovereign wealth funds 
(together, alternative venture capital (AVC)) were turning their attention to 
private markets in hopes of capitalizing on the high returns of unicorn firms 
before they go public.78 AVCs focused on financing unicorn firms because of their 
potential to disrupt the market, transform entire industries, and add value to their 
 
 72. See Horton, supra note 1, at 201. 
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 74. See JAY R. RITTER, INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: MEDIAN AGE OF IPOS THROUGH 2019, tbl. 
4 (2020), https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2020/02/IPOs2019Age.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MS59-CYLD]. 
 75. Erdogan et al., supra note 73. 
 76. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Risk of a Billion-Dollar Valuation in Silicon Valley, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/business/dealbook/the-risk-of-a-
billion-dollar-valuation-in-silicon-valley.html [https://perma.cc/BDN9-5MHK]. 
 77. See Erdogan et al., supra note 73. 
 78. See Anat Alon-Beck, Alternative Venture Capital: The New Unicorn Investors, 88 TENN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020); Jamie Hutchinson, PowerPoint Presentation for the SEC Committee on Small 
and Emerging Companies (Feb. 15, 2017) (available on the SEC website at 
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/hutchinson-goodwin-presentation-acsec-021517.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WD87-YKSJ]) (PowerPoint Presentation entitled “Why Are More Companies 
Staying Private?”); see also Erdogan et al., supra note 73; Matt Levine, Unicorn Buybacks and Securities 
Law, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 16, 2017, 8:33 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-02-
16/unicorn-buybacks-and-securities-law [https://perma.cc/37S6-VS5J]; Craig Doidge, G. Andrew 
Karolyi & René M. Stulz, The U.S. Left Behind? Financial Globalization and the Rise of IPOs Outside the 
U.S., 110 J. FIN. ECON. 546, 569 (2013) [hereinafter Doidge et al., The U.S. Left Behind?]; Craig 
Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, The U.S. Listing Gap, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 464, 472 (2017) 
[hereinafter Doidge et al., The U.S. Listing Gap]; Craig Doidge, Kathleen M. Kahle, G. Andrew Karolyi 
& René M. Stulz, Eclipse of the Public Corporation or Eclipse of the Public Markets? 11–12 (Eur. Corp. 
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 547, 2018) [hereinafter Doidge et al., Eclipse of the Public 
Corporation]; Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter & Zhongyan Zhu, Where Have All the IPOs Gone?, 48 J. FIN. 
& QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1663, 1690 (2013). 
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overall portfolios.79 Unicorn founders were eager to get in bed with AVCs because 
it provided the ability to stay private longer by raising large amounts of capital. It 
should be noted that unicorn founders also have an incentive to continue to 
control their firm80 and to not subject themselves, their management teams,81 
trade secrets, or strategy to public market scrutiny.82 For them, AVC financing is 
a new and very attractive path to maintain control over the firm while raising 
capital for growth. So why do a direct listing? 
Thanks to AVCs, unicorn founders didn’t need the traditional public markets 
to raise capital, but they discovered that they needed to provide liquidity in order 
to continue to attract, engage, and retain smart, skilled, and talented employees, 
as explained below.83 Therefore, the direct listing was a perfect new alternative to 
the traditional IPO. 
The direct listing was intended to grant employees and early investors an 
opportunity to gain liquidity, while also allowing founders to maintain control84 
over the management of their company.85 But, despite the hype of direct listings, 
 
 79. See Alon-Beck, supra note 78. 
 80. See Michael Ewens & Joan Farre-Mensa, The Deregulation of the Private Equity Markets and the 
Decline in IPOs, 33 REV. FIN. STUD. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 4), 
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 81. For a discussion on the motives to go public, see Richard A. Booth, The Limited Liability 
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REV. 79, 89–92 (1997), and James C. Brau & Stanley E. Fawcett, Initial Public Offerings: An Analysis 
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2018, at 26 (2018); Levine, supra note 78; see also Andrew Nussbaum, Steve Cohen & Karessa Cain, 
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2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/02/08/private-equity-year-in-review-and-2020-
outlook/ [https://perma.cc/2XFL-WNHB]. 
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 84. See Grabar et al., supra note 64. 
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was followed by well-known tech companies, such as Facebook, Groupon, LinkedIn, Snap, Trip 
Advisor, and Zynga. Indeed, according to data-provider Dealogic, ‘[m]ore than 13.5 percent of the 
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L. REV. 687, 693–707 (1986). For new legislation authorizing dual-class listing, see NYSE, LISTED 
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many firms continued to go public by using the traditional IPO model86 due to 
design flaws in the old direct listing model. 
First and foremost, companies could not use direct listing to raise cash from 
the public.87 Second, a direct listing can be very risky for newcomers such as early-
stage start-up firms, for example.88 It is mostly suitable for unicorn firms, such as 
Spotify and Slack, which have broad household name recognition.89 Third, some 
critics have questioned whether direct listings actually align the interests of the 
employees and the firm.90 Fourth, questions remain as to whether direct listings 
can facilitate an adequate price discovery process. Unlike a traditional IPO, a 
direct listing has no book building and the financial advisers do not facilitate the 
price discovery (except on the opening price).91 One thing is clear: even notorious 
unicorns that recently went public did not choose to pursue the direct listing 
strategy, and the future for the new direct listing model is still unclear.92 
D.  SECONDARY MARKETS 
AVCs are able to invest in unicorn firms thanks to the development of new, 
dynamic secondary markets.93 Unicorn firms developed new liquidity alternatives 
because of the prolonged timeline to IPO or trade sale, which can be longer than 
eleven years.94 Liquidity practices allow unicorn shareholders to liquidate their 
investments as an alternative to traditional exit mechanisms.95 These new 
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BUDX]. 
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Unicorns?, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 16, 2018), 
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the proceeds from the sale of securities on the primary market go to the issuing company, whereas 
the proceeds from the sale of securities on secondary markets go to the selling investor and not the 
company that initially issued the stock. See Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 
161 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 193–94, 227 (2012). 
 94. The timeline to IPO used to be four years. See RITTER, supra note 74; Levine, supra note 78; 
see also Erdogan et al., supra note 73; Hutchinson, supra note 78. For more information on the decline 
in the U.S. IPO market, see generally Doidge et al., The U.S. Left Behind?, supra note 78; Doidge et 
al., Eclipse of the Public Corporation, supra note 78; Doidge et al., The U.S. Listing Gap, supra note 78; 
and Gao et al., supra note 78. 
 95. See Katie Roof, SoftBank’s Big Investment in Uber Comes to a Close, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 28, 
2017, 12:51 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/12/28/softbanks-big-investment-in-uber-comes-to-
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practices include secondary sales, structured liquidity programs (private tender 
offers), and other liquidity alternatives.96 
The alternatives aim to allow shareholders to gain liquidity, while allowing 
founders to maintain control97 over the management of their company. The 
development of electronic secondary markets has increased liquidity for 
individual investors but has also raised several legal issues for the issuers.98 A 
number of unicorns allow their employees and capital investors to sell their shares 
on secondary markets, using electronic platforms such as NASDAQ Private 
Market (formerly SecondMarket), SharesPost, and Forge Global.99 
There are advantages and disadvantages to this new development. On the one 
hand, “[t]he direct market is improving the liquidity of start-up stock for locked-
in investors by lowering the[] transaction costs.”100 On the other, these markets 
can expose non-accredited investors to risks and uncertainties due to current 
contractual arrangements, and securities and tax laws.101 
Both the sellers of the shares and the unicorn firm are subject to the risk of 
lawsuits by buyers due to omissions and misstatements under the securities law.102 
The trading can also trigger public registration under Section 12(g), which would 
force the unicorn into an IPO due to an increase in the number of shareholders.103 
Unicorns are private and according to a new study by Professors Gornall and 
Strabulaev, their valuations are uncertain.104 These developments have 
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implications for corporate governance mechanisms. 
E.  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS 
Equity ownership is changing, and the time may be ripe for the development 
of corporate governance principles for unicorn firms as equity ownership 
increasingly moves away from retail investors to institutional players. With the 
unique capital and ownership structures remaining in place following direct 
listings, whether a board of directors is able to sufficiently monitor and oversee 
management practices is a practical governance question that must be answered 
before direct listings can be solidified as a practical alternative to the traditional 
IPO process. These governance-related implications present risks to existing and 
potential shareholders in the near-term and in the long-term. 
Founders of unicorn firms are often able to control the board of directors with 
super voting rights or other dual stock arrangements, which enhances their power 
within the firm.105 Founders of unicorns that have dual-class share structures 
might try to push for more influence over their management and firms.106 
Professors Broughman and Fried have further shown that the ex-ante likelihood 
of founders reacquiring control via IPO is extremely low, especially if the focus is 
on control that is both strong (founders have enough voting power to ensure they 
remain in the saddle) and durable (control lasts at least three years).107 
Regardless of the SEC’s intentions in changing the new direct listing rule, the 
actual effects must be considered within the context of implementation. Even in 
such a short period of time, these effects may be seen with the recent direct listing 
of Palantir (NYSE: PLTR), Asana (NYSE: ASAN), and the nature of their capital 
structures.108 At the time of its listing, Palantir’s three founders retained almost 
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(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 405, 2018). 
 108. According to their S-1 Registration Statement, Palantir plans on going public with two 
classes of stock, with Class A retaining one vote and Class B with ten. Palantir Tech., Inc., 
Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) (Sept. 21, 2020). The firm intendeds to add a third, Class F 
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complete control of the firm, coming just shy of a majority in voting power despite 
failing to control a majority of the shares.109 Immediately preceding its direct-
listing, Palantir faced pressure to amend its S-1 and finally, on its final 
amendment, the firm erased the language on “Stockholder Party Excluded 
Shares” which allowed the founders to nearly unilaterally adjust their total voting 
power.110 Even with the removal of this language, the founders can continue to 
reduce their current equity holding to a bare minimum and retain this near 
majority control.111 This pattern is not unusual in dual-class arrangements,112 but 
it is arguably facilitated by going public via a direct listing instead of a traditional 
IPO. 
These newer direct listings could aptly be renamed as “Dual-Class 2.0.” With 
direct listings, there is no capability to force sunset provisions into these 
structures—a method the CII views as a potential avenue for limiting founder 
power post-IPO.113 The CII has long opposed dual-class structures, endorsing the 
position of “one share, one vote” as one of their core focuses since their founding 
in the 1980s.114 At the same time, there is pressure on unicorn companies that 
are going public via traditional IPOs with dual-class shares to include mandatory 
sunset provisions in their charters, which can terminate the dual-class structure 
after seven years.115 Such mandatory structures, however, have faced criticism.116 
There has been very little correlation between the time period of sunset provisions 
and any actual value stemming from allowing the founders to maintain such a 
level of control.117 As seen with the Viacom and Redstone family litigation, there 
is clearly some benefit to having these founders eventually lose control.118 
However, after seven and fifteen years respectively, the founders of Facebook and 
Google still retain control and continue to demonstrate their ability to create 
value for their shareholders.119 Mandatory structures also create “problematic 
incentive structures” for founders, incentivizing them to use their control to 
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engage in short-term excessive risk taking to maximize personal economic gain as 
they approach the date of their loss of control.120 Boards of directors would be 
powerless to stop founders from simply draining the coffers and running. 
While there remains disagreement regarding how best to eliminate dual-class 
equity structures, institutional investors, academics, and others have long agreed 
that they need to be addressed and their continued allowance remains a 
controversial subject.121 Even key policy makers within the SEC have expressed 
opposition to such structures, including former Commissioner Robert J. Jackson, 
Jr.122 and Investor Advocate Rick Fleming.123 Commissioner Jackson noted that 
while the vast majority of companies going public fail to include dual-class 
structures, of those that do, “nearly half . . . gave corporate insiders outsized voting 
rights in perpetuity,” requiring investors to not just trust visionary founders, but 
their descendants as well.124 Controllers face few negative risks for their actions 
and remain well-insulated from the “disciplinary force of the market” they would 
face if they lacked voting control.125 There is even evidence to suggest that dynastic 
ownership of firms leads to underperformance relative to other firms.126 A later 
empirical study of dual-class companies published after Commissioner Jackson’s 
remarks found that in over 80% of firms with such a structure, controllers needed 
less than a 10% equity stake to maintain their control over these firms, with many 
requiring less than 5%.127 Fleming argued that dual-class structures may result in 
a “wave of companies with weak corporate governance” and force investors into 
the same game as “late-stage venture capitalists . . . willing to pay astronomical 
sums while ceding astonishing amounts of control to founders.”128 
The ability of firms to direct list with little to no pressure will do nothing to 
address these concerns while allowing for potentially significant damage to public 
marketplaces, the effects of which cannot be accurately predicted. During a 
traditional IPO, such structures would likely draw criticism from potential 
investors and questions from underwriting investment banks. However, with 
direct listings, there is little need for compromise. There remains little need to 
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generate interest in new shares, allowing companies like Palantir to show 
“anything is possible in corporate governance with a direct listing.”129 
This new practice might become a liability for unicorn firms because it alters 
the traditional corporate governance arrangements and monitoring practices of 
management and founders. Therefore, corporate law must evolve and take these 
new developments into account when deciding on how to interpret the board of 
directors’ fiduciary duty in cases involving unicorn firms. Courts, including 
Delaware’s, need to take into account that there are new shareholder groups with 
divergent interests and new, complex governance matters and contractual 
arrangements, regardless of whether they will eventually expire or continue into 
perpetuity. 
In addition to the considerations resulting from dual or multiclass structures, 
we can already see that the intended liquidity effects of the direct listing’s 
supposed greater efficiency can be artificially constrained. While the three notable 
examples of direct listings, Spotify, Slack, and most recently Asana, did not 
include lock-up periods for existing shareholders, Palantir has already designated 
a significant lock-up period lasting until shortly after their December quarterly 
earnings report, and restricting these sales to a limited, unspecified portion of 
their holdings.130 Some have taken this as an attempt to avoid rapid departures of 
investors given the firm’s apparent inability to find a path towards profitability.131 
Since their direct listings on September 30, 2020, both Asana and Palantir saw 
their shares trade above reference prices.132 However, they have continued to 
trend downwards in the recent days of trading.133 While it is too early to tell the 
long-term implications of these early trading results, it is nonetheless a stark 
reminder that these companies and their shareholders lack a safety net without 
the stabilization mechanisms associated with a traditional IPO. The initial 
unknowns surrounding firms which have conducted direct listings highlight the 
need to shed light on unicorn firm operations or enforce strong corporate 
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governance mechanisms.134 Unicorns should develop new corporate governance 
guidelines, compliance policies, and procedures. However, if the four examples of 
major unicorn direct listings continue to succeed in driving investor demand and 
in future attempts to raise capital, there may be little incentive for other unicorns 
looking to go public to ever develop these policies and procedures. 
III.  CLOSING THOUGHTS 
The market for direct listings will undoubtedly continue to fluctuate in the 
coming years as companies and exchanges continue to search for viable 
alternatives to the traditional IPO process. While the SEC believes the recent 
changes to the NYSE rules sufficiently protect investors from the risks associated 
with direct listings,135 Professor Horton raises valid concerns over the lack of an 
equivalent to the gatekeeper underwriters associated with a traditional IPO.136 
Even if the risks stemming from the lack of such a gatekeeper were addressed in 
provisions beyond the typical securities law sections, there is still some evidence 
that the process may result in significant risk to investors in a broader range of 
areas. 
Until we see further use of the direct listing process, there will be an unknown 
aspect as to whether these financial advisers have transitioned from gatekeepers 
to “barbarians at the gate.” While this may be representative of an increase in risk 
to the investors in the public markets, we believe that direct listings present a 
viable alternative to the traditional IPO process and will provide an important 
alternative method of capital fundraising and liquidity for companies seeking to 
gain access to the public capital markets. We merely believe that regulators should 
address the concerns raised by Professor Horton and ourselves in this piece to 
ensure that the investor risks we brought attention to can be mitigated to the best 
of their ability. 
Should courts, or even the SEC itself, find that underwriter liability can apply 
to the financial advisers used in direct listings, there are still serious practical 
concerns in the ability to seek remedies from the actually culpable actors and 
calculate damages. Furthermore, the concerns associated with unicorns staying 
private longer and failing to provide their investors with liquidity may be able to 
be addressed more safely via the development of secondary markets. While these 
markets carry with them their own independent set of risks, particularly related 
to disclosure pre-liquidity event, this may serve as a better method to address these 
investor concerns without jeopardizing the broader public markets. Finally, the 
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lack of an underwriter in the initial process may imply significant risks beyond the 
initial liquidity and capital raising event. 
The larger governance concerns which have longer lasting implications for the 
overall structure of a company have already begun to manifest in recent direct 
listings. Particularly concerning is an inability to address complex dual-class equity 
structures which allow founders to continue to retain control nearly indefinitely. 
Investors run into both short and long-term risks if the rules around direct listings 
are left as they currently stand: largely undefined and filled with unknowns. 
Without regulatory action, companies will continue to push the boundaries of 
what is possible with such filings, with investors along for the ride, for better or 
for worse. 
